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Chapter 3
COMMUNICATING EUROPE: THE 
CHALLENGE OF EUROPEANISATION  
OF COMMUNICATION
Petra Leppee Fraize*
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration
Zagreb
The single biggest problem in communication is the illusion that 
it has taken place.
George Bernard Shaw
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the issue of communicating Europe to the 
European public, the importance of which has been accentuated by the 
acknowledged existence of a communication gap in the European Uni-
on. The paper looks at the experience and practice in the field of com-
munication and refers to evidence of how the EU, its member states, 
candidate countries as well as Croatia have so far communicated Eu-
ropean issues to their publics. The findings suggest several conclusi-
ons. Firstly, the practices resorted to so far have had an impact on the 
democratic feature of the EU and the public support it has acquired, but 
also on its practical everyday functioning. Secondly, there are nume-
rous elements that account for the difficulties that exist in making the 
communication of Europe truly successful. Thirdly, the Europeanisa-
tion of communication should be taken into consideration as a way of 
contributing to the filling of the communication gap. Communication 
focusing not only on teaching facts but also on raising people’s interest 
about European issues has become an EU policy of growing importan-
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ce and a crucial instrument for ensuring the future ability to justify and 
win support for the European integration project. 
Key words: 
communication, information, democratic deficit, communication defi-
cit, Europeanisation, Constitution (European Union Constitutional Tre-
aty), European Union, Croatia 
INTRODUCTION
From the beginning of the European integration process until 
the mid 90s, in line with the perception of the EU as an elitist project, 
communication with the public was marginalised and carried out on an 
ad hoc basis. During the last decade, due to the evolution of the process 
(increase of EU competences, broadening of its scope of action) and 
the rise of public awareness, various general and topic-oriented com-
munication strategies were adopted.
So far, communications have not been entirely successful beca-
use they were not based on principles of good communication. Instead 
of focusing on citizens’ interests and needs, the EU and its members 
presented the information they wanted to distribute. At the same time 
the implementation of communication strategies was inadequate and 
fragmented.
In recent years, partly due to internal events such as the 2004 
enlargement and the Constitutional Treaty (hereafter the Constitution) 
ratification, communication has become an important item on the prio-
rity lists of EU institutions (e.g. the Barroso Commission was the first 
one to have nominated a special vice-president for communication), of 
presidencies, such as the Irish, Dutch, and Austrian, as well as of mem-
ber states.i The EU has adopted a new approach to information and 
communication and introduced specific proposals to enhance openness, 
transparency, accountability and the participation of European citizens 
in decisions about the future Europe. Nevertheless, due to various rea-
sons and obstacles, the EU’s success in communicating Europe is still 
limited in scope.
The paper touches upon five communication-related issues. Fir-
stly, it introduces the concept of democratic and communication defi-
cit. Secondly, it stresses the importance of the communication concept 
and policy. Thirdly, it gives an overview of what the EU, its members 
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and candidate states as well as Croatia have done so far in this field. 
Fourthly, it identifies some of the features of communication that often 
act to its disadvantage and account for its limitations. Finally, it explo-
res the concept of Europeanisation in relation to communication and its 
potential improvements. In the conclusion the paper draws attention to 
elements that need to be taken into account when devising and imple-
menting communication strategies. It suggests that Europeanisation is a 
means to improve the communication of Europe.
DEMOCRACY AND THE COMMUNICATION 
DEFICIT
In recent years there have been debates about the concept of 
democratic deficit in the EU. Considerable efforts were put into analy-
sing it and regularly led to the conclusion that an element inherent to 
this issue is the notion of a lack of legitimacy in the EU. The deficit is 
reflected in the ideas that power holders are not sufficiently accounta-
ble, nor are their decisions responsive to public preferences or subject 
to their scrutiny (de Vreese, 2003; 2004). These discussions worked as 
a trigger for changes introduced into the development of the EU, such 
as direct European Parliament (hereafter Parliament) elections back in 
1979 or the Constitution’s proposal to link the future choice of Euro-
pean Commission (hereafter the Commission) president to results of 
the Parliamentary elections. These changes were introduced in order to 
create a more direct link between the formerly European Communities 
and latterly European Union institutions and the European public.
Today, the EU seems equally to be suffering from a communi-
cation deficit. Communication is one of the many complex issues that 
account for the political crisis that Europe is facing at present. In many 
ways the two deficits are intertwined and exhibit similar symptoms – in 
order to preserve democratic features and justify its continuous existen-
ce, the EU needs to improve communication with its stakeholders, i.e. 
citizens. Democracy is more than merely giving citizens the possibili-
ty to take a decision in a referendum – it is “not a mechanical process 
of aggregating preferences and determining majority opinion” (Kurpas, 
Meyer and Gialoglou, 2004:1). Its requirements can only be fully met 
when complemented by communication. To the extent that European 
institutions and states provide information, they are well advised to 
avoid “feeding” citizens knowledge based on propaganda. Instead they 
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should try and bring European issues home and render them meaning-
ful to people in their daily lives. Above all, raising public awareness 
concerning the EU seems a valuable endeavour, since it contributes to 
the legitimacy and sustainability of the project. Thus a basis is created 
on which the public can form an opinion or even engage in governance 
in an active and responsible way. 
Throughout the EU history there has been evidence of a com-
munication deficit: the no votes in the referendums (Maastricht Tre-
aty in Denmark in 1992, Nice Treaty in Ireland in 2001, euro in Sw-
eden in 2003, Constitution in France and the Netherlands in 2005); a 
record low turnout at the last Parliamentary elections (below 50%) and 
the 2003 accession referendums (e.g. Hungary 46%); a recorded decli-
ne in levels of trust in European institutions (European Commission, 
2005:19-20); general support for EU membership and evidence of a 
rise of negative EU sentiments across Europe not only in traditional-
ly eurosceptic countries like Britain and Denmark, but also in founding 
members such as France and Italy.ii Inadequate communication is fur-
ther reflected in different perceptions of the same concept. For instan-
ce, referring to the same Constitution during ratification referendums, 
French voters argued that under the Constitution their country’s power 
would diminish, while the Dutch were of the opinion that the big coun-
tries, like France, would become stronger (Mulvey, 2005). Finally, de-
spite the fact that over the years the citizens’ own perception of the ex-
tent to which they are informed has become more positive, knowledge-
related questions indicate that citizen awareness and basic knowledge 
about the EU is still very low (European Commission, 2002:86-99). 
The communication gap between the EU and its citizens is not 
new, but today it seems to be greater than ever. As the June 2005 Euro-
pean Council showed, it coincides with a general state of a deep crisis 
in the EU that goes beyond the need to handle the Constitutional issue. 
What seems to be a big issue is the EU capacity properly to absorb the 
ten new member states and the general enlargement fatigue. The fact 
that “old” Europe seems to be saturated by successive accessions partly 
accounts for some of Europe’s current issues, such as the slowing down 
of the further enlargement process. However, the fatigue can also be 
considered a result of insufficient, unsuccessful and often biased com-
munication in the old member states before enlargement. In addition, 
people feel remote from the EU institutions and the decision-making 
process. Voter apathy indicates that the importance of Community deci-
sions and their impact on a national policy is not yet established facts 
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among citizens. Views differ on how to resolve the problem of recon-
ciling global competitiveness and innovation with social security and 
environmental sustainability. There is a sense of uncertainty about the 
finality of the European project and a virtual collapse of a shared, com-
mon view on what the basic purpose and objectives of the EU should 
be (Palmer, 2005). All this puts the issue of communication at the heart 
of the European crisis.
IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNICATION
The importance of communicating Europe is multifold. Firstly, 
lack of proper and continuous communication can have an impact on 
the democratic concept of the EU, resulting in the low turnout at Par-
liamentary elections. Another result comes in the form of practical re-
percussions in the everyday functioning of the Union, such as the dilu-
tion of the Constitution ratification process, blocking the future effici-
ent functioning of the organisation. 
Secondly, the right to information, freedom of expression and 
communication among citizens and power holders are at the heart of 
democracy in Europe and underpin political systems at the European 
and national levels.iii In line with these principles, all European citizens 
have the right to fair and full information about the EU, to access infor-
mation in their own language, to express their views, to be heard and to 
have an opportunity for a dialogue with the decision-makers. After all, 
EU decisions have impacts on various areas of public life and accordin-
gly merit close public scrutiny and involvement (Kurpas, Meyer and 
Gialoglou, 2004:2).
Although sometimes used as synonyms, there is a clear distin-
ction between information and communication. Information is a one-
way flow of facts and figures whereby a certain policy or particular 
measure and their implementation are presented (often associated with 
a top-down approach). Communication, on the other hand comprises 
information presented in the form of key messages adapted to particu-
lar audiences, and requires an interactive approach. In the EU context 
this two-way process is reflected in the fact that Brussels both dissemi-
nates and receives information. 
Thirdly, communication is crucial for the provision of the kind 
of knowledge about the EU capable of bolstering support for the insti-
tution. As the first Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty showed, the 
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anti-EU camp had successfully taken advantage of the lack of knowle-
dge by putting forward a simple but powerful line: If you don’t under-
stand it, say no. As European issues are increasingly becoming salient, 
holding referenda may become a new trend. Ignorance of the electorate 
can prove risky to future political decisions. This holds true whether a 
referendum relates to a given state or to a group of states. France, for 
instance, plans to hold a referendum on every enlargement after the ac-
cession of Croatia; the recent no-votes in the referenda concerning the 
Constitution affected supporters and opponents equally strongly. 
Fourthly, communication is a tool with which to win support for 
certain measures that have been adopted and to enhance the chances 
of their successful implementation. There is a growing trend of public 
protests and referendums for the expression of views and decision ma-
king on issues such as membership, key policies, endorsement of treati-
es and constitutional documents. In this context public opinion has be-
come an important benchmark for political decisions and is often likely 
to be incorporated in policy making (de Vreese, 2004:3). It can be noted 
that resort to direct democracy rather than reliance on parliamentary re-
presentation and dissatisfaction with party politics are evident trends in 
almost all European countries. This may, therefore, not be an EU-speci-
fic problem, but it still underlines the general value of communication 
– communication matters, because public opinion does. The challenge 
put before communication is to facilitate exchange, the learning pro-
cess and dialogue (European Commission, 2006:13).
It can be debated whether there is a direct correlation between 
communication policies and public support for the EU. One could also 
contest the assumption that a well-informed citizen would necessarily 
be pro-EU. Nevertheless, for the sake of argument, our working hypot-
hesis is that a (good) communication strategy and sound knowledge 
will tend to make the EU more acceptable.
Communicating Europe in the European Union
Although the project is over 50 years old, and was initiated by 
democratic Western European states, an analysis of information and 
communication policy in the EU shows that the process of integration 
was not really communicated until relatively recently. The circumstan-
ces in which the project was launched (the aftermath of the Second 
World War, the beginning of the Cold War) enabled the integration pro-
63
cess to start without any direct popular influence or approval. Over the 
course of time, European cooperation had a positive effect on econo-
mic and political stability. All of a sudden, citizens were encouraged 
to require information about national politics and to be involved in the 
national decision-making process. However, for quite some time Euro-
pean integration was considered a project of the European political eli-
te, while citizens showed little interest in European issues and were not 
involved in the development of different integration aspects (enlarge-
ments, treaties, policies, etc).
After the initial negative Danish referendum on the Maastricht 
Treaty, stronger emphasis was put on “getting Europe across”. The idea 
was to stimulate a debate on Community matters, improve public par-
ticipation in the decision-making process and strengthen public confi-
dence in European administration. However, until the mid 90s the cre-
ation and implementation of policy related to communicating Europe 
was mainly within the remit of European institutions, and their appro-
ach to activities was limited. Once a special Press and Communica-
tion Directorate-General was created, the Commission brought its ca-
pacities for the analysis of public opinion and the press, for the design 
and implementation of information campaigns and day-to-day political 
communication together under one roof. 
The first impetus to fostering communication came at the time 
of creation of the monetary union when Communication on the In-
formation Strategy for the Euro was adopted in 1998. The communi-
cation, explaining the reasoning behind a common European currency 
and the mechanisms for its introduction, was rather successful. It ado-
pted a decentralised implementation approach and adapted information 
to the specific characteristics of individual countries and target groups. 
By contrast, the Communication Strategy for Enlargement for Period 
2000-2006 (2000) failed to define any specific concrete actions to be 
deployed, which left EU representations, member states and candida-
te countries on their own to devise communication tools. In 2002 the 
Information and Communication Strategy for the European Union cal-
led for a coherent and comprehensive EU information and communica-
tion policy. It envisaged the EU capacity to formulate messages focu-
sed on priority issues and to disseminate them in partnership with the 
member states. Taking into account the problem of persistent ignorance 
about and indifference towards EU affairs, the Laeken Declaration on 
the Future of Europe (2001) called for a deeper and wider public de-
bate on the future of the EU. As a result, a Convention was convened 
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and was charged with drafting a new treaty.iv The text of the Constitu-
tion incorporated a number of measures to improve democracy in the 
EU. A greater role was assigned to both national and European parlia-
ments and the concept of European citizenship was given greater we-
ight.v This was perceived as an unusually open and transparent incen-
tive to undertake a broad public discussion about future Europe. Obvi-
ously, the Convention had failed fully to meet the criteria of successful 
communication, since Europe soon faced two rejections and several 
postponed ratification procedures. These have contributed to the pre-
sent EU political crisis and provoked a new debate in Europe’s commu-
nication policy.vi 
In June 2005 European Council launched a reflection period, 
aiming at “clarifying the content of the European project and infusing 
it with a fresh political impetus to push reform forwards” for months 
to come (De Clerck-Sachsse, 2005a). Modernisation of the Commis-
sion’s communication service and practices was outlined in the Action 
plan to improve communicating Europe by the European Commission 
(2005). Three principles underpinning the new plan were: not just in-
forming but also listening to the citizens and taking their views into ac-
count; communicating in an understandable way how EU policies af-
fect everyday life and what added value they bring; and “going local” 
by adapting messages, channels and messengers to national and local 
audiences and their concerns. Additional focus was put on strengthe-
ning the Commission’s representations in the member states. In Octo-
ber 2005 the so-called Plan D for democracy, dialogue and debate was 
launched. This communication action plan encourages, structures and 
directs ongoing debates about Europe at the Community and national 
level on the basis of an additional “d”, decentralisation, since the main 
responsibility for effective debating lies with opinion multipliers at the 
state, regional and local level. The most recent White paper on Euro-
pean Communication policy (February, 2006) serves as a consultation 
paper intended to engage stakeholders to express their views and send 
comments on the tabled proposal until July 2006 in order to jointly sha-
pe Europevii. The White Paper identifies five areas in which joint acti-
on, based on the principles of inclusiveness, diversity and participati-
on, should be taken: defining common principles, empowering citizens, 
working with the media and new technologies, understanding Europe-
an public opinion, and doing the job together. With a view to success 
in its objectives, the paper even envisages framework documents such 
as a non-binding Charter on Communication, which would define citi-
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zens’ rights to be fairly and fully informed on European issues, or a vo-
luntary Code of Conduct on Communication, which would bind various 
EU actors to respect good practices of communication.viii 
The results of various communication activities at all levels and 
the outcome of national debates will serve as input for the adoption of 
a concrete Road Map. The map would define the modalities of further 
action for the future Europe in the Constitutional context.
Communicating Europe in member states  
and candidate countries 
As regards the EU member and candidate states, studies demon-
strate that countries take an individual approach to communication, 
their success rates differing accordingly (Brnčić, 2005). Following the 
initial rejections of the Maastricht and the Nice Treaty, Denmark and 
Ireland respectively successfully combated inadequate information and 
popular ignorance by launching intensive and extensive campaigns. 
After a long period of a low-profile communication, the Netherlands 
today bases its communication on decentralisation and a network of 
governmental and non-governmental organisations that adapt target-
oriented activities. In contrast to the decentralised method of commu-
nication in Finland and Sweden, after accession to the EU Austria re-
duced its information and communication activities, eventually brin-
ging about a drop in public support. During the pre-accession period, 
Cyprus, partly due to its focus on internal political issues, neglected the 
importance of communication, while Slovakia, despite its elaborated 
strategy and invested financial resources, failed to make use of these 
advantages. Slovenia was considered to have given a successful exam-
ple of a transparent and coordinated process of communication. Hun-
gary invested a lot of effort and money into cooperation with the me-
dia and developing specialised information for different target groups. 
Malta created the Malta Information Centre, an independent institution 
whose neutrality, expertise, awareness of citizens’ needs, good coope-
ration with the media, budget and involvement in the overall negotia-
tion process contributed to the success of the communication strategy. 
It is worth describing briefly two examples of one more and one less 
successful communication strategy.
For the purpose of preparing the citizens of Ireland for the se-
cond referendum on the Nice Treaty, a National Forum on Europe was 
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created. Various national and European figures – Irish government offi-
cials, European and national parliamentarians, representatives from ci-
vil society and academics from across the EU and beyond – used the 
forum as a framework for a debate about the EU and Irish member-
ship in the Union. The openness of the Forum to the public enabled the 
citizens to get actively involved and its value lay in the creation of con-
ditions in which a national body was able to discuss matters relevant 
at both the national and the European level. People became aware that 
deliberations about the issues at stake were of great importance to their 
future and that their decisions could have a wider impact that extended 
across the national borders (Brnčić, 2005). In addition, in 2002 an ex-
tra impetus to communicating Europe came from a civil society campa-
igning organisation called the Irish Alliance for Europe (Laffan, 2004). 
A “coalition of the willing and the available”, with only two employed 
people and a group of volunteers conducted qualitative research. The-
ir aim was to analyse what had gone wrong during the first referendum 
and to anticipate issues that could prove salient in the near future. The 
Alliance invested a lot of effort into creating a new, energetic and hig-
hly visible image, whilst their good media team made sure the Alliance 
got sufficient media coverage. The idea was to conduct a positive cam-
paign, but also to counteract the arguments of the “no” side. The Alli-
ance supplied speakers and participants for the meetings held by the 
Forum and was committed to having people on the street. Its credibility 
derived from its ability to combine the experience of older people with 
the energy and talent of the young, and a willingness to debate the big 
issues of integration as well as the technical details of the Treaty.
Hungary used to have a fairly long tradition of political and pu-
blic support for the integration process. Just three months before a deci-
sive referendum on the accession in 2003, however, eurosceptical atti-
tudes became widespread, causing a decline of support. Not only were 
the former government communication strategies ineffective because 
of shortages of resources, but the referendum campaign was late in be-
ing launched (mid-March 2003) and was then conducted in a centra-
lised manner. And then the elite and the mass media failed to use the 
long accession process to teach the general public at least the EU ba-
sics. The signing of the Constitution in Rome and the Parliament’s ap-
proval of the current Commission were the first two European events 
ever, in the history of the Hungarian media, to have become headlines 
in the country’s quality press. Neither the centralised communication 
campaign before the referendum, nor the competition of the political 
67
parties facing the first European elections in Hungary in 2004 managed 
to get people involved in the ongoing intellectual dialogue and political 
debates about the future of Europe (Hegedüs, 2004). Furthermore, du-
ring the negotiations with the EU, public discourse was mostly limited 
to the timing and the conditions of accession. Discussions about the ne-
eded adjustments focused on the socio-economic and legal dimensions, 
while the issue of “political harmonisation” was largely neglected. In 
the name of “objectivity”, the news media often described accession in 
terms of a simplistic and rather technical dichotomy of the advantages 
(benefits) and disadvantages (costs) (ibid., 2003). Finally, as a conseq-
uence of the domestic political struggle, little space was left for deeper 
intellectual and rational debates, and the citizens maintained their euro-
pessimistic stereotypes.
COMMUNICATING EUROPE IN CROATIA
Given the fact that EU membership is one of the two main stra-
tegic foreign policy objectives of Croatia, the country faces communi-
cation challenges similar to any EU member state or candidate country. 
Communicating Europe is not only an obligation but also a tool to acq-
uire the support needed for the final decision on EU accession. There is 
an increasing public interest in the substance and possible implications 
of Croatian accession in the EU. As the process develops, tasks and in-
formation needs put forward by citizens are becoming more concrete. 
Consequently, in January this year a revised Communication Strategy 
for the period 2005-2007 was adopted.ix The aim was to adjust EU-
related information and communication activities to new public needs 
and bring changes to the approach to communication policy. The provi-
sion of information to the public was invigorated with the aim of reac-
hing as large an audience as possible (through TV shows, for example). 
A sectoral approach to specific target groups according to their interests 
was developed and new activities were initiated in line with the dyna-
mics of the negotiation process; one such initiative was the launch of 
a new website related to accession negotiations.x In addition, a Natio-
nal Forum was established in order to encourage a public debate about 
Croatian accession to the EU at all levels of Croatian governance and 
within society until the referendum day. By including ministers, parli-
amentarians, the business sector, academics, regional representatives, 
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NGOs and students the Forum provides for a variety of views as well as 
specialised contributions to the debate.xi
A comparison of the results of the twelve public opinion surveys 
conducted since the year 2000 reveals the evolution of public opinion.xii 
In the period between 2000 and 2003, the EU was generally perceived 
as being, in the light of the past, a desirable option and support of citi-
zens for EU membership was rather constant (72-79% in favour). Sup-
port decreased to 51% when Croatia acquired candidate status and re-
ached its lowest point in June last year (42%) upon the delayed opening 
of the accession negotiations. Over the years, then, belief among Croats 
that EU membership will bring about general and economic progress 
and a higher standard of living has declined and is now held by less 
than a half as against over two thirds earlier. 
These surveys fail to offer explanations as to why general sup-
port has decreased over time. For this purpose, more thorough research 
is required. An analysis would most likely confirm that some of the re-
asons are general and similar to those other countries experienced befo-
re joining the EU. In the accession process, people’s focus shifted from 
abstract symbolism to the concrete and often painful realities of mem-
bership. In addition, one would certainly find country-specific issues 
that have had negative effect on public opinion polls, such as the speci-
al protocol later added to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, 
increased international pressure regarding cooperation with the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, traditional produ-
ction of cream and cheese and the sale of real estate to foreigners.
The latest round of public opinion surveys conducted in Decem-
ber 2005 showed that almost 49% of citizens support the idea of Croa-
tia acceding to the EU, as opposed to 44% who do not. The participants 
thought that EU information in the media, the most common source of 
knowledge about the Union, is still limited.xiii Opinion-makers should 
make use of these findings and respond to people’s priority concerns 
reflected in the surveys, such as the effect of the accession on economic 
development and everyday life, the rights and obligations stemming 
from EU membership as well as the impact of membership on Croatian 
internal policies and its sovereignty. 
The objective of communication is eventually to “create” a 
well-informed citizen prepared to make a final decision concerning 
accession to the EU in a referendum. In recent years these efforts have 
by and large been complemented by a growing number of diverse acti-
vities initiated and carried out at the regional and local level, as well as 
by the thriving civil society in the country.
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FEATURES OF COMMUNICATING EUROPE
Never before has the EU paid so much attention to communica-
tion and transparency as today. Paradoxically and ironically, the gene-
rally low support for the EU comes at a time when awareness of com-
munication issues seems to be very high on the Brussels agenda. The 
Constitution, which had its origin in a feeling that the EU had become 
remote from its citizens, has ended up alienating some of them even 
more (Reynolds, 2005; De Clerck-Sachsse, 2005b). There are several 
features of communication that may account for this fact and that sho-
uld borne in mind when developing, implementing and assessing com-
munication. 
•  Policy still undeveloped. Governments have traditionally ratified EU 
agreements in their parliaments, assuming a majority would vote in 
favour (Keohane, 2004:1). For years they have lacked a coherent and 
sustainable communication strategy and have assumed that feedback 
from the public would be positive. Therefore, there was very little 
need for explaining, listening and the anchoring of EU issues in con-
temporary national politics. As a consequence, people are still not 
used to forming a view about something they know little about, while 
the EU and European governments are not used to “selling the story” 
to their citizens. 
•  Objective of communication. Communications are rarely clear abo-
ut the goal they want to attain. Is the purpose of communication to 
have half a billion EU citizens informed about EU facts? Or is it to 
make citizens become more active and participative in EU life? Do 
we want to make people understand the EU or to make them love 
it? Not only is the “Union’s message” poorly spelt out, but in additi-
on it is often difficult to avoid making various messages sound like 
propaganda. The Dutch referendum has shown that it is counterpro-
ductive simply to try and win people over, because “the EU is not a 
branded product, but aspires to be a democratic political enterprise 
that citizens may decide not to like, even if they are properly infor-
med” (Kurpas, Meyer and Gialoglou, 2004:3). Communication sho-
uld not be only objective-oriented (gaining support), but content-ori-
ented (fostering public debates). Positive outcomes at referenda or 
high support expressed in opinion polls surveys may well be the ul-
timate objective of the EU and its member states. However, they do 
not necessarily prove that communication has essentially been suc-
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cessful. Communication should not aim solely at teaching facts but 
also at raising people’s interest in European affairs.
•  Who communicates Europe? Since EU governance is multi-level – 
European-wide, national, regional and local – there is no exclusive 
ownership over the European project and thus none over communi-
cation policy. All levels of governance should be able and willing to 
take up their share of responsibility for communication and to coo-
perate.xiv The Commission can induce reform steps, set up an overall 
framework within which more specific communication policies can 
be developed, and generate information and core messages that are 
universally applicable.xv The importance of national parliaments in 
this field is significant, since citizens identify themselves more easi-
ly with them than with the European Parliament. However, EU issu-
es still play a limited role in election campaigns since politicians are 
rarely elected on the basis of their European positions. Some argue 
that the present EU crisis originates at the national level and is due to 
national methods of dealing with the EU (Seidenfaden, 2005:75). In 
practice, national governments often take the credit for favourable re-
sults, but use Brussels – EU institutions or other member states – as 
a scapegoat for unfavourable outcomes. According to some, member 
states have little interest in communicating the benefits of the EU. 
The absence of communication from them serves to preserve the pu-
blic impression of the powerful nation state and increases their room 
for manoeuvre at the negotiation table and in the preparatory stages 
of decision-making (Kurpas, Meyer and Gialoglou, 2004:4). Media, 
often considered more credible than politicians and a key resource 
of information, are a powerful mediator and a vital opinion-maker 
among the public. Over the years, the frequency and spread of co-
verage of EU affairs across a variety of sections in newspapers have 
increased. Nevertheless, the quality, relevance and objectivity de-
pend to a large extent on expertise, cooperation with the government 
in providing information and the role of media as an honest catalyst 
of information. Finally, the responsibility partly lies with the public, 
which needs to be active in exploring and looking for information. 
“Hunger for knowledge has to imply that one is prepared to walk to 
the store cupboard oneself and not to be expected to be spoon-fed by 
a flunkey” (Sainley Berry, 2006). The public appears to be receptive 
to EU intentions to interact more with citizens (47% would like to be 
more involved), although only around a quarter (26%) of citizens feel 
involved in European affairs (European Commission, 2005:38). 
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•  Domestic or European issue? Politicians often play domestic politics 
with European issues. For instance, election campaigns for European 
Parliament are still fought predominantly over national rather than 
EU issues, while 2007 presidential candidate ambitions seem to have 
triggered a division in the French socialist party with respect to sup-
port for the Constitution. On the other hand, during national elections 
European matters may be high on the campaign agendas (the exam-
ple of French presidential elections in 2002). The domestic political 
realm plays an important role both in forming opinion about the EU 
and in voting in European issues. Due to lack of knowledge the ele-
ctorate may often be influenced by government performance and is 
likely to formulate views on the basis of the closest to what it kno-
ws – national political considerations (Keohane, 2004:3; de Vreese, 
2004). EU-related themes, even when they are commonly identifi-
ed in most countries, are often immediately framed in a national con-
text. Different issues dominate the debate in different countries, since 
different issues are high on the agenda in different national contexts 
(Kurpas, 2005). Even irrelevant issues may then become salient and 
divisive. This was the case with the matter of defence policy during 
the Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty even though defence provi-
sions did not affect Ireland’s neutrality. The French and the British 
cannot agree whether there is too little or too much of “social Euro-
pe”. The Spanish benefit from structural funds, while the Dutch com-
plain about their budgetary contribution. But in such cases, at least, 
the problems are perceived as being “European” and a sense of the-
ir apartness from domestic issues is maintained. A greater problem 
occurs when people use the EU frame as an opportunity to “let off 
steam” and express dissatisfaction with their national governments. 
While doing so, they indirectly affect things on scale much larger 
than the national.
•  Referendum. There seems to be a growing tendency to hold referenda 
where public preferences can be articulated, as a way to work around 
the democratic deficit and communication gap. However, some have 
contested the appropriateness of using a referendum in the EU con-
text. Some Europeans are more acquainted with having a say in EU-
related decisions, while others like the Dutch and the Belgians had 
their first referendum ever.xvi Often, the consequences of an individu-
al referendum go beyond the country in which it is held – a French no 
had an affect on other Europeans who had basically no possibility of 
participating in the French debate or influencing French public opi-
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nion. How democratic is it to rely on a referendum that rejects what 
a large number of countries and political institutions, including the 
government and parliament of the no-vote country, agreed to? To a 
certain extent referendum is a tool for testing the ability of national 
politicians to convince the electorate that national interests can effe-
ctively be represented within the deeper and enlarged Union (Crum, 
2005). It is also a “notoriously unsubtle instrument” forcing voters 
to give a yea or nay on issues of immense complexity (Closa, 2004). 
Referenda in the EU context have their advantages and disadvanta-
ges: they may make governments’ decisions more plausible and justi-
fiable, but they may also have a negative spillover effect across bor-
ders. Therefore, except in Ireland where there is a constitutional obli-
gation, a decision to hold a referendum is essentially defined by po-
litical factors. Due to their unpredictability, those who decide to hold 
them must seize the opportunity that referenda offer by running acti-
ve campaigns to convince European citizens of the EU’s merits (Ke-
ohane, 2004:5).
•  Easier to promote no. Those who advocate the EU out of conviction 
or because they have been actively and directly involved in the pro-
cess must understand that the merits of the EU may not be self-evi-
dent to half a billion EU citizens. The pro-European camps appear 
to be weaker in sending out a clear message and to have greater dif-
ficulty in mobilising supporters compared to the eurosceptics who-
se strong calls for withdrawal from the EU or downgrading of EU 
competences better reach out to people. The anti-EU camp is often 
more active and uses its opponent’s failure to communicate as a way 
to dismiss initiatives as unacceptable. In addition, there is something 
in the political dynamic of an EU referendum campaign that favours 
the no side. The parties in the European integration context are divi-
ded along anti-integrationist – pro-integrationist lines. A growing cle-
avage not across, but rather through the party spectrum has taken the 
place of the classic left-right divide. This forms unusual alignments 
of parties in the yes camp who in other circumstances would engage 
in sharp political debate (Seidenfaden, 2005:70; Closa, 2004:4). This 
new ideological cleavage can significantly shake up national politics 
and leave voters confused.
•  Speaking with one voice. Today Europe finds itself amid divisions 
between the EU and its members over the future political course of 
the Union, questions of how much further the EU should deepen and 
enlarge, deliberation concerning how to proceed with the Constitu-
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tion. The inability to find a common stance has made speaking with 
one voice and an attuned communication policy hard to attain, even 
within institutions where more coherency could be expected (e.g. the 
Commission). As long as national override the European interests the 
public will hardly be convinced to give unanimous support to certa-
in EU initiatives. “What interests the Poles is what will come out of 
Poland, not the future of the Union as a whole” (Beunderman, 
2006). 
•  Communica(c)tion. Partly, a gap between elite and public opinion 
stems from their different concerns and the perception of policies 
that should be Europeanised and areas in which power can be con-
ferred on the EU (de Vreese, 2004). The gap certainly cannot be fil-
led only with communication. It requires a switch from symbolism 
(EU flag, anthem, currency or the Internet .eu domain) to practicali-
ties and should be complemented with actions that deliver concrete 
results. The issues that are bothering EU citizens have greater varie-
ty and more subtle nuances than covered by the line between yes and 
no. European citizens are concerned about issues such as further en-
largements and the effects of cheap Eastern labour on the European 
market, the fear of loss of sovereignty and the emergence of a super-
state. Europe is felt to be too liberal and market-oriented and to have 
undermined western European welfare standards. Then there are is-
sues such as the reduced share in the representation of old member 
states in EU institutions due to the last enlargement; contributions to 
the EU budget are perceived as bringing little in return. National in-
fluence is felt to be marginalised, and immigrants are increasingly re-
sented. Therefore, successful communication must necessarily reflect 
and address priority concerns, and convince people that the EU gua-
rantees and improves the quality of life and work. The effects of mo-
dernisation and globalisation have brought about new challenges. In 
order to become more tangible to people, the EU needs to deliver in 
three priority areas: prosperity (economic growth, competitiveness), 
solidarity (social dimension, employment, ageing population) and se-
curity (justice, terrorism). 
•  Understand your public. Knowledge, interest and public support for 
European integration is influenced by many factors. Political involve-
ment and the socio-economic situation, clarity of communication and 
accessibility of information, adaptability of sources to users and the 
political situation at a given moment explain why certain elements 
prevail over others in different settings.xvii An illustrative calculation 
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shows that EU society has stratified into layers (social classes based 
on education and employment) and divided into sectors (government, 
agriculture and business, for example). This in turn produces around 
100 groups of citizens in each country, whose different information 
needs have to be met accordingly (Sainley, 2005). 
EUROPEANISATION OF COMMUNICATION
The term Europeanisation is an increasingly popular concept in 
both public discussion and literature and has been attributed a range of 
definitions.
Firstly, Europeanisation is defined as an increase of crossborder 
public and private issue-formation in Europe, where the increase can 
mean more new issues (volume) and more intensely contested issues 
(contents) (Schendelen, 2003:30-40). It can originate from a public or 
private, European or a domestic dimension (EU, European federation, 
national ministry or a regional trade association). It also occurs in two 
opposite directions: from the European to the domestic level (an issue 
created in the EU or another country) or vice versa (an issue created at 
home). The outcome is either a binding decision or a policy proposal 
made by the EU; a private agreement which may be made among com-
panies from various countries; the issue may remain where it origina-
ted, or even simply disappear. 
Secondly, Europeanisation defined in relation to the impact that 
European policy has upon the public policy of the member states enta-
ils two steps. First is the decision- and policy-making at the EU and se-
cond their incorporation in the discourse, political structures and public 
policies at the domestic level (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004:4). Europe-
anisation in the sense of transformation of national politics comprises 
both legal and institutional obligations. This evolves in line with Eu-
ropean rules and standards, objective changes in economic structures, 
interests of individuals in European affairs and less tangible aspects 
such as subjective changes in beliefs, values, expectations and identity 
(Emerson, 2005). 
Thirdly, another area where Europeanisation seems to be slow-
ly anchoring is European administration. Here Community law gradu-
ally affects its basic principles, such as the process of opening up care-
ers and working conditions for civil servants across Europe. These pro-
cesses may serve as a foundation for the future creation of a European 
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administrative space. Administrative cooperation among states outsi-
de the scope of Community competence could thus have an impact in 
terms of social intercourse, the development of common methods and 
approaches and the invention of new instruments (Mangenot, 2005). 
Further, for instance, the Europeanisation of a truly European 
political culture would entail European political parties in the Parlia-
ment developing their local bases better and national parties coopera-
ting across frontiers.
The process of Europeanisation has two dimensions: a verti-
cal, representing a connection between the EU and respective national 
levels, and a horizontal, which represents a connection among the dif-
ferent national publics themselves (Kurpas, 2005). Vertical Europeani-
sation entails national and regional public spheres paying more attenti-
on to EU issues, concomitantly with adequate continuity, depth and dif-
ferentiation. The Europeanisation of national debates could help clarify 
how national representatives engage in multi-level European governan-
ce and explain that decisions are arrived at with the active and con-
structive participation of national representatives. The Europeanisation 
of communication could use a great deal of support from a more sub-
stantive Europeanisation of policies. This entails anchoring EU policies 
into a country’s political, economic and social life on an everyday basis 
which in turn should allow European (external) affairs to be perceived 
as domestic (internal) issues. Strengthened cooperation, firmer inclu-
sion of the European dimension into the national level (vocational tra-
ining for national and regional multipliers, school curricula) and trea-
ting EU politics as items with more domestic relevance could contribu-
te to a better linking between the national and the EU dimension. The 
vertical flow of information between the EU and the member states has 
improved in recent years, but there is still lack of consistency. Euro-
pean developments usually only make headlines when national leaders 
are meeting in Brussels or when a moment of celebration (enlargement) 
or crisis (directive on free movement of services) can be reported.
Today the public sphere within which political life and deba-
tes take place in Europe is by and large the national sphere. Horizon-
tal Europeanisation in this context would entail that national and regi-
onal spheres create genuine transnational debates and communicative 
exchange across national borders. This process is at present relatively 
weak and still limited. If developed over time, it could eventually cre-
ate a common European public sphere where debates across national 
publics foster mutual understanding and an EU civic awareness (Kur-
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pas, 2005; European Commission, 2006:4-5). Ideally, increased linka-
ge of different national public arenas with each other and with the EU 
level, and an opportunity for a European debate to unfold would also 
lead to a better mutual understanding among Europeans. To a certa-
in extent, the existing positive examples of this dimension are, for in-
stance, the existence and activities of transnational European lobby and 
interest groups (e.g. Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisati-
ons, COPA) whose common goals in the EU arena gather different sta-
keholders beyond national frontiers. This dimension can be further fo-
stered by initiatives such as that which envisages the possibility for one 
million people to sign a petition against a certain EU decision. A failed 
attempt of Europeanisation is reflected in the inability to establish a 
Europe-wide referendum on common European issues such as the Con-
stitution. Arguably, if referenda had been held closer and not according 
to individual national timetables, this could have helped create a more 
pan-European debate on the issue instead of making referenda debates 
mainly national in their content. The horizontal connection of the dif-
ferent national publics has made some progress, but Europeans still di-
scuss things too often in “national isolation”. Although they face many 
of the same problems, they often do not compare each other’s solutions 
in a broader public debate, let alone discuss them with each other.
A common European approach in communication is challenged 
by various factors. For instance, since the new generations in the “old” 
Europe have been born “into” the already existing framework of Euro-
pean integration, it is therefore more difficult to communicate what it 
provides them. Furthermore, different concerns in different states make 
it more difficult to create an efficient common communication appro-
ach and leaves room for misperceptions and misinterpretations. Final-
ly, the Europeanisation of communication is also blocked by the lack 
of a common vision of Europe, of finalité of the integration process 
and of true Europeanisation of politics. As Mazucelli (2005) notices: 
“The Dutch referendum is a true reflection of the popular reality that 
is an uncertain idea of Europe. As the expression of a people, this vote 
is also the chance for us to revisit those images of Europe’s project, 
some of which we have come to take for granted, and others that we are 
only beginning to see.” This is a reality that makes the Europeanisation 
of communicating Europe communicating a moving target (Laffan, 
2004).
It is important to add that the creation of a common European 
public sphere does not imply application of a uniform, one-size-fits-all 
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approach. As already mentioned, an ongoing critical and truly public 
discourse at the European level is difficult to attain due to various hin-
drances. Some of them are a variety of national interests, absence of a 
common language or the fact that people are accustomed to their own 
traditional sources of information. Nevertheless, some degree of Euro-
peanisation is justified by the fact that the present European political 
system is that of joint decision-making, whereas European citizenship 
is a social as well as a legal reality. Political legitimacy is no longer cre-
ated solely by national governments or electorates, and “disconnected” 
national actions are increasingly out of place in Europe (Meyer, 2005). 
Therefore, a realistic and desirable approach is to create a common 
European sphere based on a more decentralised model suited to spe-
cific political contexts and adapted to the diverse requirements of co-
untries, regions, localities and sectors. In addition, the fact is that par-
ty systems, interest groups and media are still firmly anchored in the 
environment of the respective nation states (Nicolaidis and Weatherill, 
2003:121-122). Therefore the model also needs to be denationalised in 
the sense that actions are based on common principles and coordination 
across the continent (European Parliament, 2004). In this way national 
public spheres do not have to be considered as obstacles to be overco-
me, but rather as the building blocks of a European public sphere (Kur-
pas, 2005). 
CONCLUSION
The European integration process brings changes in living and 
working conditions to all parts of European society. The success of be 
it membership or accession depends, among other things, on knowle-
dge and understanding of the European system, institutions and laws, 
as well as on public support. Communication is, therefore, becoming a 
crucial EU policy in changing times when general dissatisfaction with 
how Europe functions is deeper and more comprehensive and as such 
sweeps over the whole continent.
After years of a rather passive communication strategy, with 
the rise of eurosceptic sentiments and the general public awareness of 
European integration, the EU today faces a communication deficit. In 
recent years it has therefore taken steps to re-build a sense of public 
ownership of the EU and acknowledges that decision-makers must li-
sten better, explain better, and connect with citizens. 
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One of the features of communicating Europe is that to the ex-
tent that European issues appear on the agenda at all, what may initial-
ly be a common European issue often becomes entirely dominated by 
the rationale of national politics and is seen by most citizens from a na-
tional perspective. Yet, since many of the policy decisions that affect 
daily life for people in the EU are taken at a joint European level, the 
EU can no longer afford to stay remote from people nor can it ignore 
the fact that an individual country’s decisions often have a bearing on 
other EU citizens.
Therefore, communicating Europe as a joint European project 
has to have a common, complementary approach. Yet, its success will 
largely depend on – apart from coordination, financial and human re-
sources – the level of its decentralisation. An efficient share of respon-
sibility and a collaborative interplay between different levels and key 
players of EU governance may prevent the focus and implementation 
of activities from becoming “too national”, and help integrate EU affa-
irs into a local context.
Communication should be clear, comprehensible and adjusted 
to the specificities of different countries and groups. For this purpose 
the EU needs a comparative analysis of communication mechanisms in 
order to assess what channels and content of communication work for 
whom. However, most of all it should be policy-led and backed up by 
European performance. Legitimacy in the public eye can only be con-
veyed through outcomes and what the EU can deliver. Communication 
can only be as good as the policies it wants to communicate and it can-
not be a substitute for policy failures. It should be considered as a con-
tinuous and sustainable dialogue that should keep raising and maintai-
ning awareness and interest in European issues. This should not be li-
mited only to a pre-accession period or in cases of imminent referenda, 
nor should it be carried out by means of short-term, top-down informa-
tion campaigns. 
A critical public system of communication exists at the natio-
nal, but not at the EU level. In order to revive people’s awareness of 
the European dimension of the integration process, Europeanisation 
may help. Nevertheless, what may work against it is the tradition where 
governance is ultimately dictated by national interests and is shaped 
in particular national circumstances. Any effort at the EU level can be 
pushed into the background by a single current domestic aspect in any 
member state. Therefore, the main task for European communication 
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and national communications is to find the best possible way to recon-
cile and interact successfully.
If the communication problem is not solved, the EU and natio-
nal governments may find themselves in a perpetual crisis of ability to 
convince their citizens to approve of particular European actions and 
more generally to embrace or even constructively engage in EU gover-
nance as a whole. This in turn may call the future justifiability and via-
bility of the whole European integration project in question.
*  All opinions and views expressed in the article are personal and do not reﬂect the
views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration. The author would 
like to thank the referees who anonymously reviewed this paper.
i  The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe is often referred to as the (EU) 
Constitutional Treaty or the (European) Constitution.
ii  According to the Eurobarometer results (July 2006), the percentage of those 
considering the EU membership a “good thing” in Denmark is 65, while in France 
it is 49 (the EU-25 average is 55), see [http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/
eb/eb65/eb65_ﬁrst_en.pdf].
iii  Article F of the Treaty on the European Union establishes as a general principle that 
the Union should respect human rights and fundamental freedoms; Article II-71 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union states that “everyone has 
the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions 
and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall 
be respected”.
iv  For the integral text, see: [http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:
C:2004:310:SOM:EN:HTML].
v  Not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a signiﬁcant number of member
states may take the initiative of inviting the Commission, within the framework of its 
powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that 
a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Constitution 
(Article I-47:4).
vi  Other aspects that demonstrate the current EU political crisis are enlargement 
fatigue, difﬁcult negotiations for the ﬁnancial perspective 2007-2013, dissatisfaction
with the euro.
vii  The Commission’s White Papers are documents containing proposals for EU action. 
In some cases they follow a consultation process launched by a Green Paper.
viii  The connection between the White Paper, the Plan D and the Action Plan: the Plan 
D invites EU citizens to get involved in a wide-ranging discussion on the EU during 
the reﬂection period; the White Paper does not ask for people’s views on the EU
but on how to set up a long-term communication partnership between EU players; 
the Commission’s Action Plan concerns only improvement of the Commission’s 
communication.
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ix  Communication strategy aimed at informing the Croatian public about the European 
Union and preparations for membership (the ﬁrst one was adopted in 2001 for
the period until the end of 2004). Available from: [http://www.nn.hr/sluzbeni-list/
sluzbeni/index.asp].
x  http://www.eu-pregovori.hr/default.asp?jezik=2. For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and European Integration’s communication activities, see: [www.mvpei.hr].
xi  So far, four National Forums have been organised: “Let’s talk about Europe” 
(2004), “Bologna process and reform of high education” (2004), “Sovereignty and 
national identity in the EU” (2005), “Youth mobility in education and employment” 
(2006).
xii  Since mid-2000, every 6 months the Ministry in cooperation with the GfK – Centre 
for Market Research conducts rounds of public opinion research and analyses 
the attitudes of Croatian citizens towards the EU and the process of Croatia’s 
accession. Results from the latest round available from: [http://www.mvpei.hr/ei/
download/2006/01/31/omnibus_prosinac_05.ppt].
xiii  No relevant information or no information at all 54%; satisfactory and fairly 
adequate information 42%.
xiv  For a more detailed proposition of concrete steps for each group of communication 
actors with the aim of contributing to solving the problem and reaching out to EU 
citizens – EU institutions, member states, regional authorities, media, academics 
– see Kurpas, Meyer and Gialoglou (2004:3-6).
xv  Apart from having limited ﬁnancial and human resources, the Commission’s
competences are fragmented among numerous directorates and departments, 
whose different interests may not always be easy to transpose into a coherent EU 
communication policy.
xvi  For a table of EU referenda, see: [http://europa.eu.int/constitution/ratiﬁcation_
en.htm].
xvii  There has been progress in “passive communication” at EU level (more available, 
understandable and useful information on Europe website). However, as much 
as internet-based communication has the advantage of giving access to a larger 
number of citizens and being cost-efﬁcient, it suffers from several shortcomings:
redundancy, the organisation of on-line content, the nature of information and the 
ultimate scope of reach in relation to the percentage of internet users in Europe. 
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